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Abstract
Sentences such as The bags are light allow both collective (they are light to-
gether) and distributive interpretations (empheach bag is light). We report
the results of two experiments showing that this collective/distributive con-
trast gives rise to priming effects. These findings suggest that collective and
distributive readings involve different interpretative mechanisms, which are at
play during real comprehension and can be targeted by priming, independently
of the specific verification strategy associated with each interpretation.
Keywords: priming; plurals; distributivity; semantics; gradable adjectives;
ambiguity
1. Introduction
In the last thirty years, priming has served to identify the abstract rep-
resentations that people construct when producing or comprehending language
(Pickering & Ferreira, 2008; Branigan & Pickering, 2017, for reviews). This type
of priming is known as structural priming and it occurs when the processing of
a structure is facilitated after the same structure has been recently processed.
While structural priming has often been associated with syntactic priming, re-
cent studies have revealed that priming methods also serve to tap into abstract
semantic mechanisms at play during the interpretative process (Raffray & Pick-
ering, 2010; Bott & Chemla, 2016; Feiman & Snedeker, 2016; Maldonado et al.,
2017b).
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Semantic theories have proposed the existence of invisible operations to de-
rive specific sentence interpretations. For example, a silent distributivity opera-
tor (D operator) has been proposed to explain why sentences such as “Two boys
hold three bags” can have not only a basic cumulative reading (e.g., Two boys
hold three bags in total) but also a distributive interpretation (e.g., Two boys
hold three bags each). Its meaning roughly corresponds to that of each in En-
glish (Link, 1998; Champollion, 2016; Roberts, 1987). When modified by the D
operator, the VP ‘hold three bags’ applies to each atomic member of the plural
subject, so each boy is allowed to hold three bags (i.e. the bags can covary with
each boy). Distributive readings are thus explained by postulating the presence
of this D operator in the semantic representation. Using a priming paradigm,
Maldonado et al. (2017a) have recently shown that this cumulative/distributive
contrast gives rise to priming effects. Specifically, they found evidence for an
asymmetric distributive priming, suggesting that an abstract mechanism such
as the one proposed by semanticists is at play during the comprehension of these
ambiguities and can be primed.
Importantly, the optional insertion of the D operator has been proposed
to account not only for the cumulative/distributive contrast but also for every
sentence that can optionally have a distributive interpretation. Our goal here
is to extend these results to what is thought to be another instantiation of the
same operator: the collective/distributive ambiguity illustrated in (1) and (2):
(1) The bags are heavy.
a. Collective reading
The bags together are heavy, without each bag necessarily being
heavy.
b. Distributive reading
Each bag is heavy (and the bags are heavy in total as well).
(2) The bags are light.
a. Collective reading
The bags together are light (and each bag is light as well).
b. Distributive reading
Each bag is light, without the bags necessarily being light together.
In their collective reading, (1) and (2) are true as long as the predicate can
denote a property of the plural subject as a whole, without necessarily being
true of each individual member. Distributive readings, instead, entail that the
predicate is true of each atomic member of the plural subject. VPs that present
this ambiguity, such as ‘heavy’ or ‘light’, are called ‘mixed’ predicates (Link,
1983; Scha, 1984; Schwarzschild, 1996, 2011)1.
1There is a question in plural semantics of whether or not all gradable adjectives give
rise to the collective/distributive ambiguity. Some gradable adjectives have been traditionally
considered to be “stubbornly-distributive” in that they do not seem to admit collective inter-
pretations (Schwarzschild, 1996, 2011; Syrett, 2015; Glass, 2018). Recent evidence, however,
has challenged this hypothesis (Scontras & Goodman, 2017). Given that the predicates used
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Note that collective and distributive readings of (1) and (2) are not logically
independent: one reading entails the other. A scenario that makes the distribu-
tive reading of (1) true (i.e. each bag is heavy) also makes the collective reading
true. The distributive interpretation entails the collective interpretation. This
entailment is asymmetric: the collective reading of (1) can be true while the
distributive reading is false. Changing the polarity of the adjective switches the
direction of the entailment (see Table 1).
Collective interpretations of (1) and (2) seem to be the result of just applying
the plural subject to the predicate, whereas distributive readings are thought to
arise by inserting the covert D operator. That is, the collective/distributive
ambiguity of adjectival predicates is explained analogously to the distribu-
tive/cumulative contrast tested by Maldonado et al. (2017a). If the same
mechanism is required to derive optional distributive readings across different
sentences and predicates, we would expect to see priming effects at play for
sentences such as (1)/(2) as well as in the cases discussed in the previous study.
Finding priming effects related to the collective/distributive ambiguity would
provide further evidence for the existence of an abstract mechanism to derive
distributive readings. Moreover, the use of adjectival predicates brings two
important advantages. First, as observed, distributive and collective inter-
pretations can be weak or strong depending on the polarity of the adjective
(cf. Table 1). Consequently, ‘mixed’ adjectival predicates allow us to test, for
the first time, priming of specific readings independently of logical strength
(i.e. weak distributive readings might prime strong distributive readings, while
before strong distributive could only be related to strong distributive readings).
We can thereby dissociate priming effects revealing some aspects of semantic
representations and those due to logical strength during parsing.
Furthermore, sentences such as (1) and (2) allow us to dissociate the pro-
cessing of distributive readings from verification strategies that are not inherent
to distributivity. In psycholinguistics, the collective/distributive ambiguity has
been mostly investigated by testing transitive sentences such as “The boys are
painting a castle” (Frazier et al., 1999; Syrett & Musolino, 2013; Brasoveanu &
Dotlačil, 2015, among others). Distributive interpretations were isolated here
by presenting participants with scenarios where the object co-varies with each
member of the plural subject. In the example above then, the distributive sce-
nario would involve a different castle per boy. Participants may use a verification
strategy specific to distributive interpretations, based on checking for covaria-
tion of the object with respect to the subject. The processing pattern attributed
to distributivity therefore confounds verification strategy with semantic inter-
pretation. Mixed adjectival predicates allow us to isolate distributivity from
covariation, and therefore to remove this confound.
in these experiments are undoubtfully ambiguous, we will not address this discussion here.
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Collective reading Distributive reading
Positive adjective:
The bags are heavy The bags are heavy together ⇐ Each bag is heavy
Negative adjective:
The bags are light The bags are light together ⇒ Each bag is light
Table 1: Entailment relation between readings. Distributive readings asym-
metrically entail collective readings of positive adjectives (e.g., ‘heavy’). The reverse
pattern is attested for negative adjectives (i.e. ‘light’). The distributive interpretation
is the strong reading for sentences involving positive adjectives, and the weak inter-
pretation for sentences involving negative adjectives (and the other way around for
collective readings). This entailment pattern arises for most adjectival mixed predi-
cates (e.g., expensive/cheap; noisy/quiet).
2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods and materials
We used a sentence-picture matching task where participants had to read
a sentence and match it with one of two pictures (Raffray & Pickering, 2010;
Maldonado et al., 2017a, among others). In experimental trials, the sentence
involved adjectival predicates and was ambiguous between a collective and a
distributive reading. Each sentence was presented with two out of three possible
pictures: (a) a foil picture, that made both readings of the sentence false, (b) a
weak picture, that made only one reading of the sentence true (whether this
reading is the collective or the distributive one depends on the adjective polarity,
Table 1), and (c) a ‘blur’ picture, where the relevant information was blurred
so participants could not see it. Specific arrangements between pictures and
sentences gave rise to two experimental items: primes and targets (see Figure 1).
Primes were designed to force one specific sentence interpretation. There
were two types of primes: Collective primes displayed a foil and a weak collective
picture, so participants would click on the collective picture and access the
collective reading of the sentence. Distributive primes displayed a foil and a
weak distributive picture, forcing participants to access the distributive reading.
Targets could also be either collective or distributive. They displayed a weak
picture, compatible with the collective or the distributive reading depending on
the condition, and a ‘blur’ picture. Participants were instructed to select the
‘blur’ option if they felt that the overt picture was not a sufficient match for
the sentence (modeled from the “covered picture” method, Huang et al., 2013).
Table 2 illustrates how target responses are indicative of a choice between a
collective and a distributive interpretation.
Targets immediately followed prime trials. After being biased towards one
specific sentence interpretation in primes, participants were expected to select
more often a picture compatible with this same interpretation in targets, inde-




Figure 1: Illustration of experimental trials. Each experimental trial involved
an ambiguous sentence presented with two pictures. In both primes and targets,
sentences were constructed using the frame The [plural exemplar] are [predicate].
Predicates were selected among three possible predicate pairs, depending on the scale
dimension: light/heavy, cheap/expensive and noisy/quiet. Exemplars varied depend-
ing on the predicate pair. Collective primes and targets always displayed sentences
involving positive adjectives; distributive primes and targets involved negative adjec-
tives. Prime trials combined the ambiguous sentence with two overt pictures; whereas
targets presented an overt weak picture and a ‘blur’ picture. Pictures displayed three
scales, which could measure degrees of various dimensions (weight, price or sound in-
tensity). Values at the green portion of the scale represented low degrees; values at
the red portion represented high degrees.
to a greater proportion of overt responses in collective targets and of ‘blur’ re-
sponses in distributive targets. Priming of semantic interpretation would then
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Collective Target Distributive Target
(Positive adjective) (Negative adjective)





Distributive reading ‘Blur’ picture
Overt weak,
distributive picture
Table 2: Pictures compatible with each reading in target conditions. Image
selection in targets is an indicator of the reading participants have accessed. In col-
lective targets, the collective reading is made true by the overt weak picture, whereas
the distributive reading is only compatible with the ‘blur’ option. Distributive targets
display the reverse pattern: the distributive reading is made true by the overt option,
and the collective reading is only compatible with the ‘blur’ scenario. Since partici-
pants were instructed to select the ‘blur’ option only when the overt (weak) picture
was not satisfying (as a last resort), the selection of the ‘blur’ option was taken to be
an indicator of strong interpretations (participants were unsatisfied with a choice that
would be compatible with the weak interpretation).
be observed as a main effect of Prime condition in target responses. Given that
the picture compatible with the primed reading is not the same across target
conditions, we control for visual priming.
The four possible prime-target combinations were present in the experiment.
There were two primes of the same condition preceding each target (cf. Mal-
donado et al., 2017a), forming experimental triplets. Primes and target within
one experimental triplet could use predicates from the same or different degree
dimension (i.e. height, price, volume), resulting in matching or mismatching
predicate conditions. The left/right position of the ‘weak’ image was counter-
balanced.
The experimental design consisted of four fully-crossed factors to obtain 16
prime-target triplets (48 trials): 2 (prime condition) × 2 (target condi-
tion) × 2 (Predicate condition) × 2 (weak image position). A further
64 controls trials were randomly inserted between triplets. These controls were
designed to highlight both ‘blur’ and overt pictures as possible correct responses
(see Supplementary Materials).
We recruited 54 English speakers using Mechanical Turk. Participants were
paid for their participation (approx. 10 minutes). After application of a pre-
determined exclusion criterion of 75% accuracy on True and Foil controls, 33
participants were considered for the analyses. Further details about the ex-
perimental procedure and the control items are provided in the Supplementary
Materials.
2.2. Results and discussion
The responses were analyzed by modeling response-type likelihood using
logit mixed-effect models (Jaeger, 2008), keeping the random structure maximal
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when possible; p-values were obtained by a χ2 likelihood ratio test comparing
each model with a simpler one in which the relevant predictor was removed
(Barr et al., 2013). The dependent measure was the log-odds of choosing a
distributive over a collective response on target trials, after each type of prime
(see Table 2 for reading-picture correspondences). Target responses that were
not preceded by two correct prime responses (∼10%) were excluded from the
analyses.
Figure 2a illustrates the mean percentage of distributive responses after accu-
rate primes. Figure 2b separates the results depending on the Predicate Con-
dition (matching or mismatching between primes and targets). A first analysis
reveals a significant effect of Prime Condition (χ2 = 36.146; p < .001), such
that the rate of distributive responses was overall higher after distributive primes
than after collective primes. No interaction was detected between Prime and
Predicate conditions (χ2 < 1; p = .85), suggesting that the priming effect is
partly independent from whether sentences in primes and targets used the same
predicates. Indeed, the main effect of Prime Condition was still significant
when the analysis was restricted to mismatching cases (χ2 = 16.028; p < .001).
We also note that these effects could not be explained by visual priming: as
visible in Figure 1, the correct picture in the different prime conditions are the
same (only the sentence changes).
These findings suggest that priming of interpretation is at play: participants’
choices in targets appear to be influenced by the reading that was forced in prime
trials. So far, however, one cannot tell whether the priming was triggered by all
types of primes, or by solely, say, distributive primes. Maldonado et al. (2017a),
for instance, found an asymmetry between distributive and cumulative priming,
such that distributive primes influenced target selection, whereas cumulative
primes behaved just like baselines (i.e. targets after no prime). Such inquiries
require a baseline rate of responses in targets in the absence of primes, absent
here.
Finally, we should note an alternative explanation of the results in terms of a
‘verification strategy priming’. To illustrate (cf. Figure 1), in distributive primes,
participants may note that only the values of the first two first scales (those
concerning single objects) matter. If so, participants may be biased to decide
on the basis of only these two scales in subsequent targets (i.e. ‘check-two-scales’
strategy), effectively leading to an increase of distributive responses. Similarly,
collective primes may lead participants to focus on the third scales (concerning
all objects together), which would lead to accept the collective image without
even noticing that it makes the distributive reading false (i.e. ‘check-one-scale’
strategy). In short, readings may trigger specific verification strategies, which
may lead to shallow acceptance in Targets, mimicking the effect of priming
of readings we are interested in. Experiment 2 was designed to rule out this
alternative explanation and to determine from which of the prime(s) condition(s)
the effect follows.
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(a) Overall results (b) Predicate condition
Figure 2: Target results in Experiment 1. (a) Mean proportion of distributive
responses in collective and distributive targets after each prime condition. Distribu-
tive responses correspond to the selection of the overt picture in distributive targets
(red) and of the ‘blur’ picture in collective targets (blue). (b) Mean proportion of dis-
tributive responses per predicate dimension. In the matching dimension, primes and
targets instantiate predicates of the same dimension (e.g., heavy/light); in the mis-
matching dimension, predicates in primes and target belong to different dimensions
(e.g., expensive/light).
3. Experiment 2: Baseline inclusion
3.1. Methods and materials
Experiment 2 was similar to Experiment 1 except that baseline experimental
triplets were added, in which two pseudo-primes replaced the two primes (see
Figure 3). Pseudo-primes displayed one picture that made the sentence true
(correct picture), and one that made it false (foil picture), and they involved
sentences that do not instantiate the collective/distributive ambiguity. Instead,
pseudo-primes were associated with distributive/collective conditions through
the verification strategies mentioned above: decisions could be based on one or
on more than one scale (see Table 3).
There were then two types of pseudo-primes. In pseudo-collective primes,
the sentence involved a singular definite description (e.g.“The book is light”).
Correct and foil pictures only differed on one scale (i.e. the scale containing the
relevant exemplar). As in collective primes (cf. Experiment 1), participants
could make an accurate decision by verifying a single scale. Collective and
pseudo-collective primes shared a “check-one-scale” strategy. In contrast, in
pseudo-distributive primes, the sentence included the focus-sensitive operator
only, which enriches the meaning of the expression by negating its alternatives.
A sentence such as Only the book is light implies that nothing but the book is
light. Indeed, the foil image for these trials made the sentence false by satisfying
the predicate not only for the exemplar but also for its alternatives. Since foil
and correct images differed on more than one scale, participants are required to
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Figure 3: Pseudo-prime–Target combinations in Experiment 2. On top of the
four prime-target combinations of Experiment 1 (see Figure 1), Experiment 2 included
four pseudo-prime–target combinations. All pseudo-primes involved unambiguous sen-
tences and forced the selection of a picture with ‘mismatching’ scales. Participants
had to choose the same type of image as in primes, but, since the sentence was not
ambiguous, they were no biased towards one specific interpretation. Differences be-
tween pseudo-collective and pseudo-distributive primes correspond to differences in
the verification strategies that could be developed to make an accurate choice.
check at least two scales in each image. Consequently, distributive and pseudo-
distributive primes give rise to a common verification strategy.
If the effect found in Experiment 1 was due to verification strategy priming
only, we would expect both pseudo-primes and primes that instantiate the same
verification strategy to behave similarly. Instead, semantic priming should lead
to an effect for targets specifically after true primes, and not after pseudo-
primes. Then, using pseudo-primes as baselines, the potential difference between
primes and pseudo-primes within one condition, say distributive, could be used
as a measure of the priming force of distributive primes, and we could look for
asymmetries between distributive and collective priming.
The experimental design was the same as in Experiment 1 except that there
was an additional Pre-target Type factor (prime, pseudo-prime). The Prime
condition is defined here by the verification strategy (see Table 3). We ob-
tained 32 experimental triplets (96 trials) by crossing the factors. A further
64 controls were randomly inserted between triplets. A group of 55 fresh En-
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glish speakers was recruited using Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid for
their participation (approx. 14 minutes). After exclusion (cf. Experiment 1),
41 participants were included in the analyses. Responses were analyzed as in
Experiment 1.
Priming Source Prime Pseudo-Prime
Reading Priming YES NO
Verification Strategy Priming YES YES
Table 3: Items in Experiment 2. Primes and pseudo-primes in Experiment 2
differed on whether they could serve to prime both a verification strategy and a se-
mantic interpretation or only a verification strategy. While pseudo-primes do not force
collective or distributive interpretations, they share the verification strategy with the
prime from the same condition.
3.2. Results and discussion
Figure 4a illustrates the proportion of distributive responses after pseudo-
primes and primes. First, results from Experiment 1 were replicated: when
restricted to targets after prime trials (Figure 4a, right panel), the proportion
of distributive choices is significantly higher after distributive primes than after
collective primes (main effect of Prime Condition: p < .001, χ2 = 62.2).
Moreover, among prime trials, no interaction Prime × Predicate condition
was found (p = .47, χ2 < 1).
A second analysis performed on the entire data set reveals that the difference
between collective and distributive primes (i.e. Experiment 1 replication) is sig-
nificantly different from the one between pseudo-primes, as it is revealed by a sig-
nificant interaction Prime condition (collective/distributive) × Pre-Target
type (prime/pseudo-prime) (p < .001, χ2 = 17.1). This result suggests that
the priming effect is not entirely driven by verification strategy priming, or else
primes and pseudo-primes would have had the same effect in targets. Therefore,
priming of semantic interpretation must be at play.
To assess whether the priming effect was asymmetric, we analyzed the pro-
portion of responses compatible with priming within each condition (see Fig-
ure 4c); namely, the responses compatible with distributive readings in the dis-
tributive condition, and the ones compatible with the collective reading in the
collective condition. If, e.g., distributive priming were stronger than collective
priming (cf. Maldonado et al., 2017a), the difference between pseudo-primes
and primes in the distributive condition should be bigger than in the collective
one. The interaction Prime condition × Pre-Target type, however, was
not significant (p = .49, χ2 < 1), indicating no evidence of an asymmetry in dis-
tributive and collective priming. Finally, a posthoc analysis revealed a baseline
preference for collective interpretations, expressed as a main effect of Prime
10
condition in the proportion of ‘priming’ responses (p < .001, χ2 = 85.4; see
Figure 4c) . 2
These results suggest that the collective/distributive contrast gives rise to
priming of semantic interpretation, independently of verification strategy prim-
ing (which may be at play on top of the semantic effect). Despite the numeric
difference between the two effects, there was no evidence of an asymmetry of
priming from distributive or collective primes. Unlike previous experiments (cf.
Maldonado et al., 2017a), our findings cannot be straightforwardly explained
by saying that priming targets the mechanism responsible for distributive in-
terpretations (i.e. distributivity operator). Instead, some part of the abstract
representations underlying each of the readings seem to be the locus of the
priming effect.
The absence of evidence for an asymmetry could be related to the use of dif-
ferent contrasts (cumulative/distributive vs. collective/distributive), different
predicate types (transitive vs. adjectival) or some aspect of our experimental
set-up. For instance, as suggested by a reviewer, the derivation of collective
readings might also involve some additional semantic mechanism, analogous
to the distributivity operator. Something along these lines has been indeed
proposed by Winter (2001). If both collective and distributive readings are
derived, one might expect priming to arise for both readings to a similar de-
gree: priming would be targeting each specific semantic mechanism (e.g. dis-
tributivity/collectivizer operators). This would not be expected for more basic
cumulative readings, explaining the contrast with Maldonado et al.’s (2017a)
study.
4. Conclusions
Several experimental studies have focussed on the ambiguity between dis-
tributive and non-distributive construals of sentences involving transitive verbs.
Instead, we investigated the distributive-collective ambiguity in the interpre-
tation of adjectives (see also Syrett, 2015; Scontras & Goodman, 2017). Our
results establish that the distributive/collective ambiguity gives rise to priming
effects, independently of considerations of visual priming, object covariation,
logical strength and verification strategies. This shows that the abstract prop-
erties of distributivity and collectivity are accessed in on-line comprehension.
Assuming that distributive readings require a specific distributivity mech-
anism that is not present in collective construals, we might have expected the
effect of distributive primes to be stronger that that of non-distributive primes.
2This result reveals that, in the experimental context, collective interpretations are more
frequent than distributive ones (i.e. baseline preference rates). This difference in frequency
between the readings, however, does not seem to give rise to an inverse-preference effect,
whereby less preferred or less frequent constructions exhibit stronger priming effects than
more preferred ones (see Ferreira & Bock, 2006; Pickering & Ferreira, 2008 for reviews): no
evidence for an asymmetry in priming strength is observed in our results.
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(a) Distributive responses in Targets: Overall re-
sults
(b) Distributive responses in Targets: Predi-
cate condition
(c) Priming responses in Targets
Figure 4: Target results in Experiment 2. (a) Mean proportion of responses
compatible with the distributive reading on targets trials. (b) Mean proportion of
distributive responses per predicate dimension. (c) Proportion of responses compatible
with priming within each prime condition. Responses are coded depending on whether
or not they are compatible with distributive readings (left panel) or collective readings
(right panel). Target condition is aggregated for simplification.
Such an asymmetry was found in Maldonado et al. (2017a), but it was not repli-
cated here. Although the current study contrasts distributivity with collectivity
(rather than with cumulativity), this discrepancy calls for further investigation
which should inform us both about distributivity and about the mechanisms by
which priming operates in semantics.
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Supplementary materials
Experimental procedure. In both experiments, participants were instructed to
choose between two cards or pictures the one that “best illustrates the sen-
tence”. They were given two simple examples, which involved singular items
and therefore did not display the relevant ambiguity (e.g. Only the bag is light).
While in the first example the two cards were fully visible, the second example
involved a ‘blur’ picture. Participants were told that they should go for the blur
option only when the visible card was not a “good enough description” of the
sentence. No further specifications about how to perform the task (e.g. speed)
were given to participants. Note that these instructions are similar to the ones
used in previous ‘covered box’ and priming paradigms (Huang et al., 2013; Bott
& Chemla, 2016).
The two experiments were implemented using the Ibex Farm online platform.
Experimental triplets and individual fillers were administered in random order
to each participants. The presentation paradigm is exemplified in Figure 5. An
online version of Experiment 1 can be found here, and all materials, data and
analyses for both experiments are provided here.
Figure 5: Experimental procedure (Distributive-Distributive triplet). Im-
mediately after a response to given trial, the next trial would appear on the screen.
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Control trials in Experiments 1 and 2. Four types of control trials (see Fig-
ure 6) were included in both experiments. Foil controls involved an unambigu-
ous sentence (e.g., ‘The bag is heavy’) together with a picture that made the
sentence false and a ‘blur’ picture. Participants were thus forced to select the
‘blur’ option. True controls were the counterpart of foil cases. They also in-
volved an unambiguous sentence but they displayed one picture that made the
sentence true and a ‘blur’, leading participants to choose the overt picture.
Strong-Distributive and Strong-Collective controls involved the same am-
biguous sentences as in primes and targets (e.g., ‘The bags are heavy’), but
displayed a weak picture and a strong picture, which made both readings of the
sentence true. The idea behind these controls was to make participants noticing
that the ‘blur’ picture in targets could correspond to a scenario than makes
both readings true (strong picture). In the same way as prime trials raise the
likelihood of the ‘blur’ option being a foil picture, these strong controls raise the
likelihood of the ‘blur’ picture being a situation that makes both reading true.
On top of elevating the overall proportion of ‘blur’ responses in targets, these
controls should give us the baseline preference pattern between collective and
distributive readings.
Four repetitions of these four control items were included in each of the
experiments, for a total of 64 trials. Foil and True controls were used to fix the
exclusion criteria of participants. In particular, participants who had accuracy
rates below 75% in these control items were not considered for the analyses.
Instead, Strong-Distributive and Strong-Collective controls were informative of
the reading participants would access under normal circumstances. Figure 7
illustrates the results for these control items.
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